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ENFORCEMENT OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC
RIGHTS*
ALBIE SACHS**
Mrs. Grootboom had had enough.I The winter rains were
approaching and she could not bear the idea of her three children
wanting to go out of the little homemade shack in which they lived, a
little shelter she put up having to wade through water; not again, not
another year. She and a thousand others-mainly women, single
parent families, and children living in an area called Wallacedean,
not far from Cape Town-decided that that they were going to move.
They could not spare shelters, so they dragged materials to nearby
broken land on a hillside, which provided for decent draining, only to
discover that when they tried to rebuild the shelters, the land upon
which they sought to build the shelters had been allocated for low-
cost housing for 5,000 people living in these shacks. All claimed to
be entitled to housing, and all were threatened by the rains. However,
she and the others were very low in the queue.
The state was called in and told Mrs. Grootboom and the others,
you are jumping the queue; you can't occupy this land. Although
mediation was tried, it failed, and eventually the bailiffs were
. This piece is based on remarks presented at the American University Washington
College of Law on January 23, 2007.
.. B.A. LL.B. (Cape Town), Ph.D. (Sussex), Justice, Constitutional Court of South
Africa, Professor Extraordinary of the University of the Western Cape, Honorary
Professor, University of Cape Town Law Faculty and University of Edinburgh.
Formerly Member, Constitutional Committee and National Executive, ANC,
Director of Research, South Africa Ministry of Justice, Director, South Africa
Constitution Studies Centre (University of London), Professor of law, Eduard
Mondlane University (Maputo, Mozambique), Nuffield Fellow of Socio-Legal
Studies, Bedford College, London and Wolfson College, Cambridge, author of
numerous books and articles, including Soft Vengeance of a Freedom Fighter (San
Francisco, U. Cal. Press, 2000).
I. See Gov't of the Republic of S. Afr. v Grootboom & Others 2001 (1) SA
46 (CC) at 47 (S. Aft.).
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brought in and Mrs. Grootboom and the others were evicted very
roughly, very brutally. Things were knocked down and destroyed;
they ended up on an open sports field nearby. We call it a sports
field. It is a piece of dusty soil with maybe three sticks to denote goal
posts at either end.
The rains were threatening, and all they had to protect themselves
with was plastic sheeting. They had even lost their few remaining
materials they were using to construct their shacks. .Mrs. Grootboom
and the children were huddled there, not knowing what to do. I often
imagine her, lying there, looking out at the sky and the stars, thinking
about her children, and saying to herself: Why was I born? What
does it mean to be alive? What does it mean to be a human being,
just looking up and staring and imagining? What rights do I have?
I've got nothing, nothing, nothing; just some children, and the
responsibilities that go with that. What does it mean to be living in
the new democratic South Africa? I can vote. I can speak. I can move
freely if I've had the money to get from place A to place B. But here I
am without a roof over my head.
A local attorney became so indignant about the situation that he
decided he had to do something. The Constitution, in its Bill of
Rights, says that every person has the right of access to adequate
housing.2 What does that right mean to Mrs. Grootboom, lying there
on the open ground with the rain coming down, covered by a bit of
plastic sheeting? The attorney went to the High Court in Cape Town,
and the judge hearing the matter realized that this was an extremely
important case. The case was important, not just for Mrs.
Grootboom, but it was really the first kind of case under our new
Constitution in which the questions which I imagine Mrs.
Grootboom was asking herself--existential questions-have become
jurisprudential questions. What does it mean when the Bill of Rights
says, in relation to somebody sleeping out in the open bush or field
like that, that people have a right of access to adequate housing?
The judge very wisely decided that this was not a case that ought
to be determined by the weather reports. The judge stated, the rains
were coming in, I've got to give judgment within twenty-four hours
so that she can get protection or no protection. He arranged for her
2. See S. AFR. CONST. 1996, § 26(1).
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and the others to have some kind of temporary shelter so that the
issues of principle could be debated without those particular
pressures.
The matter eventually came before Judge Dennis Davis. He
looked at the clauses in the Bill of Rights, which provide that
everyone has the right of access to adequate housing. It goes on to
say that the state shall take reasonable legislative and other measures
progressively to realize that right, within its available resources.3 So
this is the text in our Constitution that has to be applied to that
particular situation.
According to Dennis Davis-a friend of mine, a very lively,
spirited, creative person and judge-as far as the obligations of the
state are concerned, records indicate that hundreds of thousands of
houses have already been made available to people in the situation of
Mrs. Grootboom. At that stage, it was a few hundred thousand
houses. Now it is well over a million houses and something
approaching ten million people in South Africa have been moved
from shacks into brick houses that have electricity, water, and
sewage arrangements. People own the houses, which they get on the
basis of a state subsidy. They pay for nothing more than water and
electricity. By international standards, this was a massive
breakthrough, almost spectacular. Dennis Davis said the state is, in
general terms, meeting its obligations progressively to realize the
rights within its available resources.
But, he said, if we look further on in the Constitution, we see that
children have certain rights that are not qualified by the concept of
progressive realization and available resources.4 Included in those
rights are the rights to nutrition and the right to shelter.5 He said
shelter might be something less than adequate housing. But it is at
least some kind of roof over one's head. That is an unqualified right,
one not subject to the resources of the state and not to be
progressively realized; 6 rather, it is immediately claimable. And so
3. See id. § 26(2).
4. See id. § 28(1).
5. See id. § 28(l)(c).
6. Compare id. § 28(1)(c) (establishing children's rights to "basic nutrition,
shelter, basic health care services and social cervices" without qualification), with
id. § 26 (requiring the State to "take reasonable legislative and other measures,
AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
he said he was going to order the state to provide shelter for the
children, and since the children could not be separated from their
parents, to provide shelter for their parents as well.
The state appealed to the Constitutional Court against this
decision.7 It was not an angry, aggressive type of appeal, the kind we
sometimes get. Rather, it was an appeal saying, here is a completely
pristine kind of provision in the Constitution, for which there is no
precedent and the implications are unknown. This could have
immense implications for government planning, resources, and
competition between different groups (all making the same claims).
The state asked, please, Constitutional Court, guide us in relation to
this matter.
The position of counsel for Mrs. Grootboom-the experienced
advocate Peter Hodes-was a very simple one.8 He said, all I'm
saying is, my client is sleeping out in the open, and if you give her
land, she will put up a shack.9 She cannot go back to where she was
because other people have filled those spaces where she was
before.° She cannot go on to that open dry land because that has
been set aside for others. She comes to court and she says, I just
want a place to lay my head.1" He did not go into the international
law dimensions, nor did he go into the philosophical dimensions, or
the budgetary or separation of powers implications. He simply said,
my client is guaranteed in the Constitution the right of access to
adequate housing, and she has nowhere to make a home, let alone a
decent house.12
within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of this right").
7. See Gov't of the Republic of S. Afr. v Grootboom & Others 2001 (1) SA
46 (CC) at 48 (S. Afr.) (arguing that the State had "complied with the obligation
imposed upon them by § 26 of the Constitution").
8. See id. at 57 (stating the two arguments of the respondents who requested
that the State provide "adequate basic temporary shelter" or "basic nutrition,
shelter, healthcare and social services to the respondents who are children").
9. Id. at 56.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. See id. (stating that the respondents were living in "intolerable conditions"
and demanding that the State "meet its constitutional obligations" to provide
shelter under Section 26 of the Constitution).
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The state argued primarily that there were major separation of
powers issues here;I3 that it is basically not the function of the judges
to determine housing policy and allocation of resources.n The judges
are not elected, and they are not accountable to the people. 5 The
state tried to say, quite nicely, that judges know nothing about
financing or building housing, housing priorities, or how to organize
the queue.16 The state is, in fact, progressively realizing the rights
within its available resources. 7 When it comes to the children's
rights, such rights are basically protected in another way. The
children's rights are protected through family law-family rights. 8 It
is not the duty of the state to provide for the needs of children
directly in that way; rather, it is the duty of the family to make such
provisions. Indirectly, the state supports families through providing
aid such as children's grants, old age pensions, and so on.
We had an applicant, coming as an amicus curiae-Jeff
Padlinder-who said, on behalf of NGOs and civil society
organizations interested in public interest litigation, they did not want
the case decided on the basis of children's rights.' 9 There are people
without children who have rights of access to adequate housing.
There are elderly people, disabled people, and ill people who all have
very special claims. Of course, children have claims, and in many
families you will find children, and housing is very much about
children. But the issue should not be decided on the clauses in the
Constitution dealing with children; rather, it should be decided in the
clauses dealing with the right of access to adequate housing.2 °
13. See id. at 61 (referring to the government's justiciability arguments raised
in an earlier case, and reasserting that budgetary implications of social and
economic rights do not "compromis[e] their justiciability").
14. See id.
15. See id.
16. See id.
17. See id. at 53-56 (detailing the state's design and execution of national,
provincial, and local housing policies). "Considerable thought, energy, resources
and expertise have been and continue to be devoted to the process of effective
housing delivery." Id. at 76.
18. See id. at 82 (interpreting Section 28 of the Constitution to place the
obligation to provide shelter to children "primarily on the parents or family and
only alternatively on the State").
19. See id. at 58-59.
20. See S. AFR. CONST. 1996, § 26.
677
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That was the issue before us. Judges on this court do not discuss
cases before the hearing. Each judge does his own research, analyzes
it, and then debates the research with other judges. For this, we
convene one day and discuss our different positions. Typically, we
feel torn and are not in complete agreement.
In this case, there were key legal elements that we had to deal
with. For example, every person has the right of access to adequate
housing.2 The state shall take reasonable legislative and other
measures progressively to realize the rights within its available
resources.12 Within that framework, what was the peg that we used to
find an appropriate mode of judicial intervention? The answer, again,
was that the state shall take reasonable legislative and other measures
progressively to realize the rights within its available resources.23
However, what can we use to determine whether or not the state had
complied with its obligations?
In relation to available resources in a certain fiscal year, what is an
appropriate percentage of the government's budget that has been
spent on housing, education, and so forth? Put another way,
considering only available resources, is the state doing its best to
address the issue of adequate housing with such resources? That is a
difficult question. How can judges decide this? First of all, we do not
know much about this, and secondly, this amounts to great
intervention on the work of Parliament and the Executive. The
elected representatives, not judges, must decide between health
education, other aspects of housing, armaments, foreign affairs, and
culture, when allocating state resources. Although we addressed
these considerations,24 we decided that this is not the way forward.
Perhaps there are other suggestions.
For example, should the importance of one's need be compared to
that of someone else's? Should the court itself decide this, or should
21. See id.
22. See id.
23. See id.
24. See Gov't of the Republic of S. Afr. v Grootboom & Others 2001 (1) SA
46 (CC) at 65-66 (S. Afr.) (emphasizing that, while a state must "demonstrate that
every effort has been made to use all the resources at its disposal to satisfy the
minimum core" of certain obligations, a minimum core determination presents
courts with difficult questions that would require prioritizing groups, causes, and
resources).
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it ask the government to do this? Perhaps the court should order the
government to develop a policy based on needs. In this case, the
government will say that is what it has been doing. This is the nature
of parliamentary business-we debate and discuss such things.
People often decide in terms of a balancing test based on policy
considerations, and this is not for the judges to decide.
Another important question is: what are reasonable measures? The
action the government has taken in the case of this woman is a
narrow question because it involves how the government has
specifically allocated and used its resources, and fulfilled its needs,
in her particular case. Here is a particular plaintiff who has a very
specific need, and the question of whether she has adequate housing
turns on what the government has done for her. Should the Court
respond to her particular claim?
A suggestion is that the court should examine such situations and
determine how specific and intense the need for adequate housing is,
and then order the government to intervene if necessary. But how
does the court measure that? Especially, how can the court determine
this for a country with a thirty to forty percent unemployment rate,
due to its whole history of apartheid, migrant labor system, citizens
being unable to use land in an economical way, massive poverty
throughout the country, and citizens with vast health, education,
nutrition, and housing needs. We asked ourselves how we, as judges
of this court, would begin to evaluate and compare this information
in an effort to reach a solution. We explored various avenues.
What is the legal text underlying such a decision? Based on
Archimedes' statement-give me a lever and I can move the world-
it is important to consider what the intellectual lever was which we
used to address the issue of adequate housing. Again, we found the
answer to be that the State shall take "reasonable" legislative and
other measures progressively to realize the right within its available
resources." Reasonableness is a concept that lawyers are very
familiar with, although they are not familiar with available resources
and progressive realization.
From a viewpoint based in reasonable measures and objectivity,
we decided that however extensive the housing program, and
25. See S. AFR. CONST. 1996, § 26.
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however admirable it was, it was insufficient simply to go in for a
massive quantitative advance and claim that accounts for what is
required.26 If some people are left behind in situations of such
extreme deprivation that links up with that special need, then the
government is not behaving reasonably. For example, it is
unreasonable for the government to say, wait fifteen years and then
you will receive adequate housing, or unfortunately there is no
remaining land available for you in this area, or there are people
ahead of you in the queue to get access to such resources and tough
luck.
But we did not want to get into a situation where courts said,
because Mrs. Grootboom is in desperate circumstances, she must get
a house, or because Mrs. Shabalala, in another province, has terrible
circumstances, she must get a house or land.2" The courts would then
be taking over functions of local government, of housing
departments. They would be determining competition between
different people for scarce resources, which would absorb all of our
time. What we said was unreasonable was that the government had a
massive program, quantitatively speaking, for housing, but it did not
have in its program special emergency provisions for people in
situations of extreme desperation.28
We said the lack of special emergency provisions was
unreasonable, and what thereafter became very clear to us was what
is called the indivisibility of human rights. The right of access. to
adequate housing cannot be separated from the right to human
dignity. 29 This becomes especially clear when people, particularly
26. See Grootboom 2001 (1) SA at 69 ("A program that excludes a significant
segment of society cannot be said to be reasonable.").
27. See id. at 62 n.22 (citing Shabalala and Others v Attorney-General,
Transvaal, and Another 1996 (1) SA 725 (CC) at 761 (S. Afr.). This case
exemplifies "[t]he right to be free from unfair discrimination, for example, must be
understood against [South Africa's] legacy of deep social inequality." Id. at 62.
28. See Grootboom 2001 (1) SA at 79 (asserting that "[t]he nationwide housing
program falls short of obligations imposed upon national government to the extent
that it fails to recognise that the State must provide for relief for those in desperate
need.").
29. See id. at 83-84 (stating that the constitutional right to housing found in
Section 26, "read in the context of the Bill of Rights as a whole, must mean that
the respondents have a right to reasonable action by the State in all circumstances
and with particular regard to human dignity").
[22:673680
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black women, find themselves in situations where they have
absolutely nothing at all, are in a crisis or emergency situation, or
there is no program on which they may call.3" We ordered the
government to develop such a program.3 Although we did not get
into the details, we indicated a program like that can take on many
forms and can involve giving land to people, providing financing for
housing loans, and performing construction of brick housing.
Indirectly, it may even involve augmenting the economy so that
people have disposable income. There is a whole range of measures
that are involved.
Such programs may be developed by the national, provincial, or
local government. The court, however, does not decide that. Rather,
it is the job of the government, the executive controlled by
parliament,32 to decide such matters. But we, who focus on the
human rights dimension, can require the government's program to
meet a standard of reasonableness, one that does not fail to account
for appropriate arrangements for people in situations of extreme
desperation-such as flood or fire victims, people who for one
reason or another have got nothing at all. Thus we imposed on the
government a legal obligation, within a reasonable time, to develop a
reasonable program to meet its reasonable obligations.33
This case followed the very first case we heard on social economic
rights, one in which the outcome led to huge dismay in the human-
rights/civil-society community.34 It involved a Mr. Soobramoney,
who suffered from acute and chronic renal failure.35 His kidneys just
were not working. When he collapsed, he went to the state hospital.
30. See id. at 87 (ordering the State had to devise a program to address the
needs of people in desperate situations-those with "no access to land, no roof
over their heads, and who are living in intolerable conditions or crisis situations").
31. See id. at 86 (requiring the State "to devise, fund, implement and supervise
measures to provide relief to those in desperate need").
32. See id. at 82 (observing that the obligations "would normally be fulfilled by
passing laws and creating enforcement mechanisms"); S. AFR. CONST. 1996, §
92(2) (making govemment officials "accountable collectively and individually to
Parliament for the exercise of their powers and the performance of their
functions").
33. See Grootboom 2001 (1) SA at 87.
34. See, e.g., Soobramoney v Minister of Health, Kwazulu-Natal 1998 (1) SA
765 (CC) (S. Afr.).
35. See id. at 766.
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After his condition was discovered, he received dialysis treatment.
However, hospital representatives told him that he could receive
emergency treatment only once, and thereafter would be required to
wait in a long queue for treatment. The representatives also told him
that the hospital had strict criteria for selecting persons for which
treatment would be most beneficial, due to a limited number of
machines (seventeen), which were very expensive to operate and
which made up a large percentage of the hospital's budget. Because
he was suffering from ischemic heart disease and had diabetes, the
hospital told him that he was a very poor candidate for renal
transplants and prioritized others over him to receive treatment. The
hospital deemed the best use of a limited amount of equipment that
the hospital had would be to serve others that had better chances of
benefiting from renal transplants.36
He then went to private institutions, which absorbed all his
family's money. He could not afford the prices charged by private
institutions, and their minimal treatment was just keeping him alive.
He eventually decided to return to the state hospital. Upon returning,
he told hospital representatives that he was in a crisis and because he
was dying, he asked them to save him.37 He then went to court and
reiterated the hospital's statement that because he was at the back of
the queue, the hospital could not treat him.3"
Our Court decided unanimously that, in those circumstances, the
medical personnel had applied criteria that were compatible with
constitutional standards and values, that they used rational grounds
for deciding who should have access to emergency treatment, and
that the selection process used was not discriminatory, except on
pure health grounds (which was relevant as criteria); therefore, we
could not order the hospitals to act otherwise.39 To move him to the
36. See id. at 769-70, 774-76.
37. See id. at 781 (Madala, J., concurring) (noting that the appellant owed a
private clinic R25 000 for dialysis treatments two to three times each week, costing
approximately RI 000 per treatment, which eventually depleted the appellant's
financial resources to the point where he could not continue treatment).
38. See id. at 769-70 (stating that the appellant's chronic renal failure
combined with heart and vascular diseases rendered him ineligible to receive
dialysis at the state hospital).
39. See id. at 771, 778 (holding that the state's failure to provide renal dialysis
facilities for all individuals with chronic renal failure did not violate Section 27 of
the Constitution because the hospital guidelines determining which applicants with
682 [22:673
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head of the queue would be to prejudice other people who had
greater health claims, by saying that government must take money
away from dealing with HIV, immunization for children, health
education programs, victims of trauma, and all other diseases that we
have such as cancer and tuberculosis. We decided that, as judges, we
could not interfere with the priorities in that particular area, and
could not say that the hospital's expenditure and way it was utilized
did not meet constitutional standards.
I still remember that counsel for Mr. Soobramoney felt a terrible
weight that he did not get the argument right, his client was going to
die, and that we as judges might get the law wrong and would be
unjustly depriving him of the chance of living longer. I said to his
counsel, who was almost shaking, if resources and compassion were
co-equal, this would be the easiest case in the world to decide, but
they are not.4" It is just a question of compassion.
That raised the whole issue of the extent to which resource
limitations can be relevant to the enjoyment of rights. I then
developed, in a short concurring judgment, that in a concept of the
role of rationing in relation to enjoyment of social and economic
rights, one's rights to freedom, vote, move, and dignity are not
rationed.41 These are rights that A can enjoy and B can enjoy and C
can enjoy, and they do not compete with each other. I can say with
freedom of speech, if one has a monopoly of the airwaves, control of
finance, etc., then indirectly there is a form of rationing through
economic power. But in terms of the concept, rationing does not
enter into ordinary, basic civil and political rights.42
chronic renal failure had access to treatment constituted a reasonable attempt to
provide, within available resources, all its citizens with access to health care
services).
40. See id. at 784 (Sachs, J., concurring) (recognizing that courts should not
unnecessarily interfere with the allocation of limited resources where political
organs and medical authorities are better prepared to make such "agonising
choices").
41. See id. at 782-84 (Sachs, J., concurring) (asserting that when socio-
economic rights are inherently shared and inter-dependent because of limited
resources, rationing should delineate when individuals have a right of access that
should "most fairly and effectively be enjoyed").
42. Cf International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights arts. 6-27, Dec. 16,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (articulating generally recognized civil and political
rights).
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When it comes to social and economic rights, and particularly
highly expensive medical interventions, there must be rationing of
such resources; for example, studies that were conducted by the
World Health Organization, the National Health Service in Britain,
among others, indicated that utilization of these scarce resources is a
control based on non-discrimination and on rational and fair
utilization of what is available. 3 And it is very difficult for judges to
determine who should have priority in matters like this. It is the
responsibility of the medical community, in relation to and in
conjunction with the families and individuals concerned, to have
ethical standards and criteria for making those determinations. 4 It is
not a decision for courts to make, especially in matters such as these.
It was our most poignant case-one that I will remember for as
long as I remember my years as a judge. And we knew that, quite
literally, we had power of life or death, in terms of the order that we
made. There was a huge reaction against us from the human rights
community, that we were using the lack of resources to determine
fundamental rights. I remember a former law clerk of ours very
angrily suggested that money for emergency treatment should be
found from wherever possible, even if it was just enough to purchase
one more machine for one more person.45 But we cannot determine
basic principles of law that have enormous impact on public life
simply on the basis of finding something, a little bit of spare money,
for someone. If that were the case, then the law would break down.
This is not like freedom rights, where every person is vested with the
43. See Constitution of the World Health Organization pmbl., July 22, 1946, 62
Stat. 2679, 14 U.N.T.S. 185 ("The enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of
health is one of the fundamental rights of every human being without distinction of
race, religion, political belief, economic or social condition."); U.K. SEC'Y OF
STATE FOR HEALTH, THE NHS PLAN: A PLAN FOR INVESTMENT, A PLAN FOR
REFORM 3-5 (2000), available at
http://www.dh.gov.uk/assetRoot/04/05/57/83/04055783.pdf ("The NHS will
provide a universal service for all based on clinical need, not ability to pay.").
44. See HEALTH PROFESSIONS COUNCIL OF S. AFR., PROFESSIONAL GUIDELINES
§ 2, pt. 6, http://www.hpcsa.co.za/hpcsa/UserFiles/File/ProfessionalGuidelines.doc
(last visited Mar. 13, 2007) (establishing the health care professional's ethical duty
to "[d]eal responsibly with scarce health care resources").
45. But see Soobramoney 1998 (1) SA at 776 (discouraging court-ordered
resource allocations because it can "deny[] those resources to other patients to
whom they might more advantageously be devoted").
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same rights under the Constitution.46 Rather, it is a question of
appropriate utilization of resources, and this is a very pressing issue
in the contemporary world, one that involves fundamental issues of
which social and economic rights must be enforced.
But that does not mean that because there are budgetary
implications, these issues automatically involve policy matters, and
the law has no role at all to play. The next big case that came before
us raised that very question. It was the Treatment Action Campaign
("TAC") case, and it dealt with claims by doctors, in particular, on
behalf of pregnant women about to give birth who were living with
HIV. The affected women claimed that they should be allowed by
the State to take the drug Nevirapine.47 The evidence was to the
effect that Nevaripine cut the rate of transmission of the virus to
children to be born by about fifty percent, which is a dramatic
impact.48 The procedure involves the mother simply taking one drop
before giving birth and the child taking a drop after birth.49 The drug
was safe, otherwise, it could not be given at all. If women had
money, they could buy it over the counter on prescription.
The Minister of Health said, however, that she was only allowing
the drug to be provided to two medical sites in each of the nine
provinces, because its management, problems of counseling, and
problems of transmission after birth by breastfeeding needed to be
studied. After two years, the Ministry of Health would be in a
46. See S. AFR. CONST. 1996, § 9 (declaring that everyone is equal before the
law and providing that "[e]quality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all
rights and freedoms").
47. See Minister of Health & Others v Treatment Action Campaign & Others
2002 (5) SA 721 (CC) at 728-30 (S. Aft.) (explaining the applicants' claim that
restrictions on the availability of Nevirapine-an antiretroviral drug used in the
treatment of HIV/AIDS-in the public health sector violated Sections 27(1) and
27(2) of the Constitution because the government failed to act reasonably, within
its available resources, to provide pregnant women and their newborn children
with the right to have access to public health care services).
48. See WORLD HEALTH ORG., ANTIRETROVIRAL DRUGS FOR TREATING
PREGNANT WOMEN AND PREVENTING HIV INFECTION IN INFANTS: GUIDELINES ON
CARE, TREATMENT AND SUPPORT FOR WOMEN LIVING WITH HIV/AIDS AND
THEIR CHILDREN IN RESOURCE-CONSTRAINED SETTINGS 8-9 tbl. 1 (2004),
available at http://www.who.int/hiv/pub/mtct/en
/arvdrugswomenguidelinesfinal.pdf (finding that Nevirapine reduced the vertical
transmission rate by 47% in the HIVNET 012 clinical trial in Uganda).
49. See Treatment Action Campaign 2002 (5) SA at 729 n.5.
20071
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position to roll out the program. 0 However, the doctors were saying
that they could not wait two years because in the meanwhile,
thousands of babies were going to be born with the virus in
circumstances in which they could be saved, especially when there
were measures that cost almost nothing and the drug was being
provided free for five years by the manufacturers. The drug was free,
had no cost implications, and it was safe. Otherwise, it could not be
used at all either in the private health sector or in the State's selected
sites. The only remaining problems were logistical, questions of
management, and possible health implications.
The State argued before us that judges do not prescribe medicines,
rather, it is the function of the Department of Health to make these
determinations. The Department of Health may be wrong, the State
argued, and if it is wrong, then it is accountable to the public, for
which there are political responses. Separation of powers supports
this - meaning the judiciary should not be involved in these policy
questions.5
The counsel for the doctors and mothers argued that in light of our
decision in Grootboom,52 it was not reasonable for the Ministry of
Health to say the drug was safe, it had no cost, and although the
doctors wanted it, we had to wait two years to see what the
implications were. 3 Counsel for an amicus curiae wanted to take the
50. See id. at 732-33 (suggesting that the government wanted more time not
only to establish the funds and infrastructure necessary to implement a
comprehensive approach for reducing the risk of mother-to-child transmission, but
also to evaluate the operational challenges inherent in introducing Nevirapine to
the public health sector).
51. See id. at 755 (acknowledging that even though no bright lines separate the
responsibilities of the different branches of government, policymaking primarily
falls within the domain of the executive branch). But see id. (clarifying that the
Constitution mandates courts to make orders that can affect policy when a specific
governmental policy is inconsistent with constitutional provisions).
52. See Gov't of the Republic of S. Afr. v Grootboom & Others 2001 (1) SA
46 (CC) at 87 (S. Afr.) (holding that the government failed to satisfy its obligations
under Section 26(2) of the constitution because its housing program did not
constitute a reasonable measure within available resources to achieve the
progressive realization of the right of access to adequate housing).
53. See Treatment Action Campaign 2002 (5) SA at 734-35, 743 (accepting the
applicants' assertion that the government's desire for a comprehensive approach to
reducing mother-to-child transmission did not provide a rational basis for
prohibiting doctors at public hospitals with adequate testing and counseling
facilities from prescribing Nevirapine to patients who needed the drug).
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matter a step further, and said the group he represented was not
satisfied with our decision in the Grootboom case; rather, the group
felt that all of the rights in our Bill of Rights are individual rights.14 It
was not just a duty of the State to have a program that was
reasonable; instead, individuals should be able to come to court and
say that the State was not meeting its obligations to the extent that it
failed to meet, at a minimum, a basic platform that could be
quantitatively determined in relation to people, whether it concerns
health, education, water, nutrition, or housing, and that it should be
an individual right.55
One of the moments that I will most remember during my years on
the bench was a debate between myself and counsel on that very
question. Counsel emphatically insisted that social and economic
rights should be seen in this way-as individual rights-and we
should not rely simply on reasonableness in relation to the state
programs. Individuals should be able to come to court and say, I have
a right to a house, I have a right to treatment.5 6 I said to counsel, on
this basis, anybody who does not have access to water can come to
court and say, I want a tap in my particular village.57
The government was rolling out a program which gave priority to
providing clean, safe, potable water, easily accessible throughout the
year, to areas where it reaches the maximum number of poor
people. 8 I questioned whether this meant that for somebody who
lives high up in a mountain, in a small community, the State must
54. See id. at 737-40 (considering the argument that Section 27(1) of the
Constitution gives everyone a "self-standing" right to have access to health care
services, therefore requiring the government to satisfy certain minimum
obligations regardless of available resources).
55. See id. at 738 (reviewing the assertion that the minimum core includes the
minimum necessities of life mandated by human dignity).
56. See id. (restating the applicants' contention that everyone denied access to
health care services, allegedly an individual right created by Section 27(1) of the
Constitution, can automatically obtain relief from a court).
57. Cf id. at 739-40 (stressing that the Constitution does not require the
government to provide immediate access to a "core" service, but merely demands
that it act reasonably in achieving progressive realization of socio-economic
rights).
58. See Rose Francis, Water Justice in South Africa: Natural Resources Policy
at the Intersection of Human Rights, Economics, and Political Power, 18 GEO.
INT'L ENVTL. L. REv. 149 (2005) (describing the evolution of South African water
policy).
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divert resources from areas where that same money could reach 500
families to reach the one family. And furthermore, who are we as
judges to decide?
He said, Justice Sachs, that is an emotional argument! I replied,
well, these are emotional questions, but those are the very real kinds
of issues that you have.5 9 Our concern is people with the sharpest
elbows, with the best lawyers, will get the water, will get the houses.
This will muck up all the programs and make planning at the local
and national levels impossible; especially if courts are constantly
involved in decisions of that kind. That was the critique from the
ultra human rights point of view. The critique from the State was that
courts have no right to get involved in policy matters at all.
The moment we were about to go into court was quite dramatic.
As we know, the whole issue of HIV/AIDS has been a very hot
political issue in our country. It has been very divisive, and there has
been a lot of criticism of the Minister of Health, and of the President
for particular positions that they spoke about some years ago. So this
was not just another case coming to court.60 I still remember the
59. Cf Treatment Action Campaign 2002 (5) SA at 754 (admitting that apart
from the HIV/AIDS epidemic, the government also faces daunting problems
involving socio-economic rights such as the "access to education, land, housing,
health care, food, water and social security").
60. See id. at 735 (emphasizing the "political, ideological, and emotional
contention" surrounding the South African HIV/AIDS debate); Thabo Mbeki,
President of S. Afr., Speech at the Opening Session of the 13th International AIDS
Conference (July 9, 2000), available at
http://www.info.gov.za/speeches/2000/000714451 p1001 .htm (implying that
perhaps extreme poverty, not AIDS, was "the world's biggest killer and the
greatest cause of ill health and suffering across the globe"); Manto Tshabalala-
Msimang, S. Afr. Minister of Health, Statement to the National Assembly on
HIV/AIDS and Related Issues (Nov. 16, 1999), available at
http://www.info.gov.za/speeches/1999/0001131124al002.htm (detailing the
toxicity of the antiretroviral drug AZT and arguing that its use "at the present time,
[is] illegal, aside from it being dangerous"); Michael Specter, The Denialists; the
Dangerous Attacks on the Consensus About H.I. V. and AIDS, NEW YORKER, Mar.
12, 2007, at 32 (reporting Mbeki's view that "H.I.V. medicines are Western
inventions aimed at maiming Africans" and his hints of "C.I.A. involvement in
propagating the belief that H.I.V. causes AIDS"); Samantha Power, The AIDS
Rebel; An Activist Fights Drug Companies, the Government-and His Own Illness,
NEW YORKER, May 19, 2003, at 54 (reporting that President Mbeki had
"denounced Western antiretrovirals, which suppressed the H.I.V. virus, as 'harmful
to health"' and "questioned the link between H.I.V. and [AIDS]").
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Minister of Health sitting in the court - I knew her from the old days
of struggle. She worked closely with my brother, who both was an
immunologist and helped develop HIV policies in this particular
area.6 I thought at one stage that if the TAC was trying to help
people with HIV, and the government was trying to help people
living with HIV, it was very difficult to see why litigation is
absolutely necessary. And when one thinks of this moment, the
moment a woman is about to give birth-one of life's most glorious
acts-and she knows that if she just takes that one drop, the child she
is about to bear has a fifty percent greater chance of living a life of a
child and a life of an adult, she thinks it is her right, it is the child's
right, it is the doctor's right.
I asked in court whether it was possible for some kind of
agreement to be reached. The court adjourned for the parties to
consider this possibility, and then there was some debate and
discussion. We came back afterwards, however, with no agreement.
We had to see the case through.62
A couple of years earlier, we heard a case of Mr. Hoffmann, who
applied for a job on South African Airways ("SAA") as a steward,
serving coffee and so on, on board.63 He passed all the exams with
flying colors, but it turned out that he was HIV positive.64 SAA said,
we will employ you, but as ground staff There are a lot ofjobs that
you can do, but we cannot have you serving coffee on board.65 What
61. See ANN STRODE & KITTY BARRETT GRANT, INST. FOR DEMOCRACY IN S.
AFR., UNDERSTANDING THE INSTITUTIONAL DYNAMICS OF SOUTH AFRICA'S
RESPONSE TO THE HIV/AIDS PANDEMIC 23-24, 31 (2004), available at
http://www.idasa.org.za/Output _Details.asp?n= I &RID=40&OTID=6&PID=23
(documenting Dr. Johnny Sachs' effort to restructure the South African National
Aids Council and increase the organization's influence on HIV/AIDS policies).
62. Cf Treatment Action Campaign 2002 (5) SA at 735 (condemning the
parties for their displays of animosity and disparagement during litigation because
the ongoing fight against HIV/AIDS requires cooperation between the government
and non-governmental organizations).
63. See, e.g., Hoffmann v S. Afr. Airways 2001 (1) SA 1 (CC) at 8 (S. Afr.).
64. See id. (stating that the airline initially designated Mr. Hoffmann as a
suitable candidate for the position of cabin attendant after he completed a four-
stage selection process that included a pre-screening interview, psychometric tests,
a formal interview, and a final role-play, but reversed its decision after he failed a
blood test for HIV/AIDS at a pre-employment medical examination).
65. See id. at 9 (noting that the airline attempted to justify its practice of
excluding HIV positive people from employment in cabin crew positions by citing
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will the passengers say? They will go to another airline. They will
just feel nervous. They know that British Airways does not employ
people who are HIV positive as stewards, so they will go to British
Airways and we will lose.
The case went to the high court, where Mr. Hoffmann claimed
SAA's practices constituted unfair discrimination. The high court
used an argument based on the fact that some planes would land in
Equitorial Guinea where yellow fever injections are needed; because
of his HIV status, he could not take those injections, and thus his
application was refused.66
The case came to us. It was a very emotional case as well. The
courtroom was small. It was jam-packed with people wearing T-
shirts saying "HIV-positive." The audience was representative of the
South African nation, with people of all different races, sex, and age
(black, white, brown, male, female, young, and old), all sitting with
HIV-positive t-shirts. There was tremendous emotion in the
courtroom.
On the day of handing down judgment, Justice Sandile Ngcobo
read the judgment he wrote for the court, which said that we cannot
allow the commercial practices of foreign airlines to determine the
fundamental rights of South Africans under our Constitution.67 And
if there is prejudice against people living with HIV/AIDS, it is the
duty of the State not to concede to that prejudice but to combat that
prejudice and to educate the public to repudiate that kind of
prejudice. There is no justification; it is simply unfair discrimination.
He ordered SAA to take on Mr. Hoffman in the job for which he was
fully qualified until such time as his condition rendered him unable
to serve SAA as a steward. As his CD4+ count was very healthy in
"safety, medical and operational grounds").
66. See id. at 18 (restating the High Court's conclusion that the airline's
employment practice did not constitute unfair discrimination against HIV-positive
individuals because it was an "inherent requirement" for cabin attendants to be
HIV-negative); see also id. at 9, 12-13 (rejecting the airline's assertion that it
could not vaccinate all HIV positive individuals against yellow fever, regardless of
the person's CD4+ count).
67. See id. at 19-20 (declaring that neither the public misconceptions of HIV-
positive persons nor the policies of commercial interests outside South Africa
justified the violation of Mr. Hoffmann's right to equality under Section 9 of the
Constitution).
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terms of somebody living with the virus, he will probably have a
good ten years to be able to do that particular job with proper
treatment.68 SAA was then ordered to take him on.69
After the judgment was read, total silence filled the courtroom. We
filed out through the back of the court, and after we got out of the
courtroom and the last person went through and closed the door, we
heard cheering and I started crying. I did not cry just because of the
impact of HIV/AIDS in our country. Rather, I started crying because
of the feeling that we had a Constitution. I am a judge on the
Constitutional Court, with the extraordinary responsibility and
possibility of protecting fundamental rights of victims of prejudice.7"
It is not the old apartheid racist prejudice, but it is another form of
marginalizing people and treating them in an unfair discriminatory
way. I found it quite overwhelming.
We filed back into court with a judgment prepared; however, we
did not read the whole judgment. A large part of the judgment dealt
with the argument from the amicus curiae, to the effect that under the
Convention on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, states are
obligated to meet a minimum core of rights, and we need a minimum
core in South Africa to measure whether or not individuals are
entitled to claim those rights.7 The General Comment made by the
U.N. Committee emphasized that states must heed the minimum core
of rights in fulfilling the progressive realization of available
resources.
Our written judgment did not reject the minimum core argument,
but we said the minimum core had to be understood as not
necessarily establishing a quantitative norm, but rather as raising a
68. See id. at 25-26 (recognizing that Mr. Hoffmann's high CD4+ count meant
that he could receive the yellow fever vaccine and would not be prone to
opportunistic infections).
69. See id. at 27 (concluding that the appropriate relief was an order of
instatement because nothing suggested that it would be unfair, impractical, or
unsuitable for the airline to employ Mr. Hoffmann as a cabin attendant).
70. See id. at 19-20 (asserting that equality must characterize this new era of
constitutional democracy and that society must never tolerate prejudice because the
Constitution respects "human dignity for all human beings").
71. See Minister of Health & Others v Treatment Action Campaign & Others
2002 (5) SA 721 (CC) at 737-38 (S. Afr.) (noting that the applicants' "minimum
core" argument focuses on how the language of Sections 26 and 27 of the
Constitution separately affirm rights and State obligations).
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question of prioritization.72 The state simply cannot spend a lot of
money on hospitals which are only for the middle class and the
wealthy, or as one finds in many countries, build houses for the army
or civil servants but leave the desperately poor out. From that point
of view, the minimum core has a quantitative dimension. It does not
necessarily imply a basic platform of entitltments, a poverty datum
line, so that anyone falling under a quantitatively determined
measure can come to court and claim their rights. We rejected the
claim that people should have individual rights justiciable through
the courts according to the minimum core argument.73
But we said, as far as the reasonableness of the State measure was
concerned, it did not meet the standards of reasonableness. To
contend that hundreds or thousands of babies can be born with a
virus-when that can be easily, safely, and cheaply prevented-
simply because one wants to understand better the program
management, is not reasonable. We were asked to order the state to
report back to us within six months what it was doing for the rollout,
but we said no, we do not need to do that. We simply have to declare
what the State obligations are. Then it is up to the State to fulfill
those obligations. If the State does not, then people can come back to
court and claim that the State is not fulfilling its obligations.
We are not saying to the State that we know better than you, that
we have this judicial power and are going to rub your noses in it.
That is not an appropriate way to function. If the State is manifestly
recalcitrant, then you can get a structural interdict, a special order
with supervision involved.74 But we are not, in that sense, looking for
a fight. We do not feel that is the way that the separate branches of
government should work. We all engage in the same project in that
sense; we are all branches of government. And if it is possible
72. See id. at 739 (reiterating that minimum core may be relevant to the
reasonableness of governmental action but is not an independent entitlement
stemming from the socio-economic rights of the Constitution).
73. See id. at 740-41 (deciding that, due to the textual linkage between
Sections 27(1) and 27(2) of the Constitution, Section 27(1) itself does not create a
self-standing right and instead must be considered in conjunction with the
reasonableness requirement in Section 27(2)).
74. See id. at 763 (explaining that structural interdicts, which require the
government to submit a revised policy to the court for constitutional evaluation,
are appropriate only when "necessary to secure compliance with a court order"
because of the government's "failure to heed declaratory orders or other relief").
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through simply declaring the law to clarify what the obligations are,
that is the way to do it. If there is continued failure to meet those
obligations, then we can get tougher.
These cases brought home to me how fundamental this notion of
indivisibility of rights is, the so-called first generation of rights;
including civil, political, and classic freedom rights found in the Bill
of Rights of the United States, as fought for in the French and
American Revolutions. The second generation of rights are those
with a strangely mixed pedigree, from Bismarck in Germany, the
Russian Revolution, and the social welfare programs of Sweden,
Norway, Denmark, and so on before and after World War II. They
include the right to freedom and the right to bread, not just to
freedom without bread nor to bread without freedom. And the third
generation of rights were created more recently to accommodate
environmental rights, rights to peace, and developmental rights.
But one sees how these three generations of rights in a way
coalesce. If a person does not have the right to go to court, a basic
civil political right,75 and a right to legal representation, that person
cannot use the Constitution to get "bread rights." It appears that in
the United States some people would say it is not inappropriate
simply to have freedom rights; presumably it means that when one is
dying of hunger one can use one's last breath to curse the
government.
We found in the Nevirapine case that human beings were being
placed in a situation intolerable in a society that has certain
fundamental standards and values.76 It just was too much. Although
judges might not know much about building houses, we do know
75. Cf International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 422,
art. 2, cl. 3 (ensuring competent judicial, administrative, or legislative review of all
enumerated civil and political rights violations).
76. See Treatment Action Campaign 2002 (5) SA at 750 (reasoning that the
government's policy of restricting Nevirapine therapy to HIV-positive women and
their newborn children contravened the constitutionally-mandated right to health
care services where treatment was readily available, potentially lifesaving, and
well within the State's available resources); Gov't of the Republic of S. Afr. v
Grootboom & Others 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) at 62 (S. Afr.) (criticizing the denial of
adequate housing as a breach of the Constitution's promise of "human dignity,
freedom and equality," and observing that the framers included the right to
adequate housing in the new Constitution because they valued human beings and
wanted to guarantee all citizens this basic human need).
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about human rights. The fact that we are not up for election is an
advantage. We are not running for office; we are not doling out
money to people who are going to vote for us, or trying to be seen to
do that. We are simply sticking to the principles, the deep principles
of what makes a society basically decent and politically moral, when
attempting to adhere to fundamental rights. The fact that we are not
up for election is a strength, not a weakness.
Each of the fundamental rights-the dignity rights, material rights,
bread rights, litigation rights, voting rights, freedom rights-might in
a particular case come to the fore, but they are all interrelated. They
are all part and parcel of the character of the society in which we
live. So that is the observation. The phrase that all human rights are
universal, interrelated, and indivisible, sounds good, but it does not
only sound good, it is actually needed in jurisprudence. It becomes
vital to finding the right answers to the question that Mrs.
Grootboom was asking-or I imagine she was asking, staring up at
the sky and saying-Why am I born? What does it mean to be born?
What basic rights do I have as a person on this earth? People have to
understand the global, interrelated, dignity-founded concept of what
rights are about.
The story that I will end with, is that of traveling with my partner,
Vanessa, to Europe about a year ago. We were traveling on South
African Airways, had just settled in our seats, and the flight had just
taken off. A very elegant young African woman, a stewardess
smartly dressed, bends down and in a near whisper she says, thank
you, Justice Sachs. It's because of people like you that I've got this
job. I thought she was referring to my years in the struggle against
apartheid as a member of the African National Congress ("ANC").77
Vanessa said, no, no, no. I don't think it's that; rather, she said, I
think it's the HIV case, the Hoffman case.
77. Despite detentions, executions, and periods of forced exile, the liberationist
African National Congress ("ANC") fought against racial inequality until the fall
of apartheid in 1994. See African National Congress, Umzabalazo: A History of
the African National Congress,
http://www.anc.org/za.ancdocs/about/umzabalazo.htm (last visited Mar. 13, 2007).
Founded in 1912, the ANC is still the leading political party in South Africa's
Government of National Unity. Id.
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Thinking back on the encounter with her, that was a very beautiful
moment for me. I did not cry. But it was just one of those little
golden moments of elation that illuminated the work that we do, and
what it means to live in a society where these values are seen as core
values, and where there are legal mechanisms, legal practitioners,
and legal thought to be able to follow through and implement them.
I will now deal with various questions that have been put to me.
The first concerns the community's acceptance of judicial decisions,
and what kind of experience the Court has had in getting executive
support of its decisions.
In the United States, there was massive resistance to
implementation of the Brown decision. What has the situation been
in South Africa?
The second question is on the extent to which the court is taking
judicial notice of the work that is being done by committees at the
United Nations and other places that are developing the concepts of
core content of economic, social and cultural rights.
The third question is about South Africa's truth report and the
opening up of a culture of storytelling for people feeling free, open,
and that their personal lives were validated in the process. Does that
kind of culture validate individual lives in that they are welcome to
come and tell their stories?
My replies:
First, the executive branch of the government is not always happy
with our decisions. Well, who likes decisions against them? That is
why one goes to court. Probably the biggest decision we gave against
government was when we declared the Constitution to be
unconstitutional.78 I think that was the first in the world declared to
78. See In re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa,
1996, 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC) 484 (S.Afr.) [hereinafter Certification Judgment 1],
available at http://196.41.167.18/uhtbin/hyperion-image/J-CCT23-96 (declining to
certify that the proposed Constitution complied with the thirty-four Constitutional
Principles required by Schedule Four of the Interim Constitution); see also S. AFR.
(Interim) CONST. 1993 sched. 4 (outlining general principles for the Constitution to
uphold, such as "universally accepted fundamental rights, freedoms and civil
liberties"); Christina Murray, A Constitutional Beginning: Making South Africa's
Final Constitution, 23 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 809 (2001) (detailing the
creation and evolution of South Africa's constitutions).
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be unconstitutional. It came about through the way in which the
Constitution was adopted, that we negotiated in advance-as
unelected negotiators-a constitution to create a democratically
elected constitutional assembly, which would then draft the final text
of the Constitution according to thirty-four principles agreed to in
advance. 9 It was left to the Constitutional Court to decide whether
the final text was compatible, whether it conformed with those thirty-
four principles. Parliament then had two years to draft the final text,80
and was just able to complete it in time, because it was despite a leap
year!
We received the text and heard arguments for ten days.8" I was put
in charge of the logistics. That is another case I will never forget.
Approximately seventy different representations were made to us
challenging the Constitution, and we upheld nine of the challenges.82
Overwhelmingly, we said this is a democratic constitution; this fits
the bill of rights, the principles on devolution, and all the main
features of the thirty-four principles.83 But we said, in these nine
particular respects, it does not measure up. 4
I still remember one of my old comrades from the struggle sitting
in the court. They are now part of government. I am now one of the
judges. As we mentioned an item that failed to meet the principles,
his jaw dropped. When we declared that another item had failed to
meet the principles, his jaw dropped a bit more. By the time we had
declared nine provisions incompatible, he had a very long face.
79. See S. AFR. (Interim) CONST. 1993, ch. 5 (observing that the new
Constitution shall "comply with the Constitutional Principles contained in
Schedule 4").
80. See id. § 73.
81. See Certification Judgment I, supra note 78, 25. The court heard
objections in person and with open debate where "all relevant issues were fully
canvassed in argument." Id.
82. See generally id. 482 (rejecting nine provisions for their failure to comply
with one or more Constitutional Principles). For example, the court determined
that the proposed text violated Constitutional Principle XXVIII in that it failed to
provide for the right of individual employers to engage in collective bargaining. Id.
83. See id. 483 (emphasizing that the proposed text satisfied the majority of
Constitutional Principles, and expressing optimism that revising the non-compliant
provisions would "present no significant obstacle" to the Constitutional
Assembly).
84. See id. 482.
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But it went back to Parliament,8" which made the corrections. A
few months later, we accepted and certified the revised text.86 We
later struck down a provincial constitution.87 I am sure the authors
were not happy, but they accepted our decision. In the Nevirapine
case, the Minister of Health said some things at one stage indicating
extreme unhappiness with the judges ordering her in effect to do
something that related to medical policy.88 But she made it very clear
afterwards that she accepted the decision, even if she did not feel it
was the right decision.
There is some argument about how whole-hearted that was. Well,
we always get arguments of that kind. The fact is it indicated to our
society and public that these questions were basically political
questions that function in the political arena, but to the extent that
they had a clear, direct human rights dimension, they could be
litigated on, and there would be a carefully reasoned, thought-
through response by the judges.
Now, as I mentioned in my presentation, the minimum core
argument featured very strongly, quite strongly, in the Grootboom
case.89 We did not follow it, although we also did not reject it.
Although it was made central to the TAC case, 90 we again did not
85. See In re Certification of the Amended Text of the Constitution of the
Republic of South Africa 1996, 1997 (2) SA 97 (CC) 2-3 (S. Afr.) [hereinafter
Certification Judgment I1], available at http://196.41.167.18/uhtbin/hyperion-
image/J-CCT37-96 (noting that, in addition to "conscientiously" addressing the
nine grounds for non-certification set forth in Certification Judgment I, the
Constitutional Assembly made numerous editorial revisions to the newest draft of
the Constitution before re-submitting it to the Constitutional Court).
86. See id. 205.
87. See Certification of the Consitution of the Province of KwaZulu, 1996, In
re: Ex Parte Speaker of the KwaZulu-Natal Provincial Legislature 1996 (4) SA
1098 (CC).
88. See Minister of Health & Others v Treatment Action Campaign & Others
2002 (5) SA 721 (CC) at 759-60 (S. Afr.) (affirming the judiciary's power to make
and influence policies that are flexible, constitutional, and consistent with
separation of powers doctrine).
89. See Gov't of the Republic of S. Afr. v Grootboom & Others 2001 (1) SA
46 (CC) at 65-66 (S. Aft.) (struggling to delineate a "minimum core obligation"
with respect to the right to adequate housing, and concluding that the ultimate
constitutional question turns not on the minimum core but on whether the measures
taken to progressively realize the right to adequate housing are reasonable given
the State's available resources).
90. See Treatment Action Campaign 2002 (5) SA at 739-40 (conducting a
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adopt it, nor did we use it as the basis for our decision. It was partly
because we felt the text of our Constitution is not identical to the text
of the Economic, Cultural, Social Rights Convention. 9 The word
"reasonable" does not appear in the Convention. In some ways, the
lever that we have is a strong lever. We thought that because we are
a judicial institution, we balance out the separation of powers and
human rights considerations, resource considerations, and the
institutional attitude considerations best by going for these programs
at the broad level. There was some disappointment amongst some
human rights advocates.
I personally feel that we have more or less got it right. I do not
usually stand up for and defend our judgments, but because I have
been a human rights activist all my life, I reflect about these things. I
think after we make decisions, and I respect very much the criticisms
that are made. And I feel that to some extent we have to function at
the level of generality. It might be that an individual is denied some
form of access to something, but we have administrative law to deal
with that. And then people use the quite extensive constitutionalized
rights that they are vested with under administrative law to deal with
individual cases. But I feel that it is appropriate that we work to the
level of declaring the obligations of the State and we leave it to the
State to fulfill them.
I also think the minimum core argument is particularly important
in countries where there might be extensive spending on health,
nutrition, housing, etc., but it is not going to those who need it most.
That was not the problem in our country. We did not need the
minimum core argument as a foundation, the lever, or the platform,
to introduce justiciability.
On a related note, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission92 was
based on storytelling. That was its strength. It was very much in the
minimum core analysis, and concurring with the Grootboom court's determination
that the minimum core is relevant but not dispositive to the constitutional
interpretation of social and economic rights).
91. See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec.
16, 1996, 933 U.N.T.S. 3.
92. See generally TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMM'N, TRUTH AND
RECONCILIATION COMM'N OF S. AFR. REPORT 1 (6th ed. 2003) (documenting the
Truth and Reconciliation Committee's findings and recommendations regarding
human rights violations).
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African tradition for people to speak their own voice, while trying to
achieve consensus and listening to everybody. It was very much the
way of Oliver Tambo, 93 president of the ANC in exile, to do things,
not to come up with a clear line. He would say this is the position,
what do you think; altering a document, and changing a definition or
paragraph. It was important to listen to everybody. So I am very
comfortable making our presentations in that way, but that does not
explain it all.
I found by the way, that if one wants to deal with questions of
social and economic rights, and get focused attention from an
audience, then one must not start with an abstraction. One should not
begin discussion with "positive and negative rights," and then
"positive state obligations." Dealing with the situation's effect on
identifiable human beings adds to the discussion. It provides a real-
life situation that people can understand, and in understanding that
situation, people understand the contradictions, the legal,
philosophical, technical, jurisprudential, and other tensions, involved
in the case.
Another reason the minimum core argument did not apply in our
country is the experiences of our generation. South Africans in my
generation feel that we had an interesting life. We do not have to
read other people's stories. We lived through our own stories. For
example, the other day I was singing to quite an elite legal audience,
including many judges, in Toronto. I was singing "Always." A judge
singing "Always!" It was a song that I sang to myself when I was in
solitary confinement-"I'll be living here always"-this was a way
of dramatizing what our generation went through.
There are stories about the making of the Constitution. There are
stories about the debates we had on the bill of rights. These are
stories of life, of conflict, of debate and argument, and that is how
ideas come. Ideas are fantastically important. I love ideas. I can get
93. See African National Congress, Oliver Reginald Tambo Biography,
http://www.anc.org.za/people/tambo-or.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2007)
(identifying Oliver Tambo as President of the ANC from 1969 to 1991 and as
National Chairperson of the ANC from 1991 until his death in 1993); African
National Congress, Oliver Tambo: Selected Articles, Papers, Speeches, Statements
and Other Documents - 1960-1993, http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/or/
(last visited Mar. 14, 2007) (collecting Tambo's writings and speeches).
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high on ideas. Other people are drinking champagne, and I am just
soaking up ideas, and it is marvelous. I get drunk. I hope a number of
you have learned that form of intoxication, because there is nothing
more rewarding for a student, an intellectual, a writer, or a thinker,
than to feel the euphoria and excitement from ideas and ideas
clashing and ideas merging.
Ideas do not just exist for battling with each other. There is a logic
to ideas. There is an internal structure that passes from generation to
generation. But it is people who carry, interpret, and give meaning
and resonance to the ideas. So that is another method I have in telling
these stories. It is not just to grab attention and make the issues more
interesting; rather, it is to highlight, with respect to fundamental
principles of law and particularly to human rights law, that these
rights are about people, and how people see themselves, their
relations, and their connection to their community, to their society.
The last point is when we are sitting up there as judges, we are not
automatons, we are not machines. If we were machines, it would be a
terrible waste of money to pay us salaries. In any event, I am trying
to communicate that when we make these decisions, we do not make
them on a purely sentimental, subjective, emotional, who-do-I-like,
who-don't-I-like basis. If that were the case, we would have given
judgment for Mr. Soobramoney. I said to his counsel, You know,
you've represented your client with great dignity, and you're not
trying to push his position ahead of anybody else.94 In fact, we have
to find a way of relating the access to these rights to the resources
that are available-the fewest possible, in our circumstances.
I am trying to indicate that judges, in exercising our judgment on
other human beings, are people. We live in this society. We feel the
drama of the country that we live in, of the world that we live in.
These are not just nice games that we are playing. We are aware of
these dimensions of the work we do. This knowledge imposes more
discipline, not less discipline, upon us. We take responsibility. That
is our form of, if one would like, moral accountability for what we
are doing, fulfilling our oath of office-to do justice to all, without
fear, favor, or prejudice.
94. Cf Soobramoney v Minister of Health, Kwazulu-Natal 1998 (1) SA 765
(CC) at 784 (S. Afr.) (stating that "If resources were co-extensive with
compassion, I have no doubt as to what my decisison would have been.").
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So when I take on this modality, this mode of telling stories, it is
not just that it is in an African tradition. It is not just that it is a way
of capturing attention and highlighting the contradictions and the
issues. And it is not just that it enables one to bring in a certain
measure of history and context, and highlight the fact that these
rights are about people. Nor just about judges being people. We are
human beings, fulfilling our functions to the best of our ability-
through our conscience, faithful to our oaths, as part of the very
society that we are judging. It is not just one of these factors. It is all
these things, all these things together.
Question from the floor: Looking at organizations such as the
Institute of Social Medicine and Community Health 95 raises
questions of human rights enforcement. For example, can one
enforce human rights if there is not a private right of action.
Regarding the lack of the non-discrimination standards in health care
in the United States, the Supreme Court has basically said, if people
cannot prove intentional discrimination, then there is no right to
sue. 96 Consider that a federal agency such as the Department of
Health and Human Services 97 has not developed non-discrimination
standards from civil rights law-in this case, the Civil Rights Law of
1964-even though it has had time to do so. And even under the
Clinton administration, in the Madison-Hughes v. Shalala case, the
court said, there are no standards in the law for the plaintiffs to sue
95. See Inst. of Soc. Med. and Cmty. Health, ISMCH History,
http ://www.ismch.org/2.aboutus/Institute%2OHistory/The%201nstitute%27s%2OHi
story.htm (last visited Mar. 13, 2007) (describing the Institute of Social Medicine
and Community Health, a Philadelphia-based non-profit organization engaged in
"health policy development, public education, progressive advocacy, societal
research and historical information").
96. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 280, 293 (2001) (affirming
earlier decisions holding that Section 601 of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act,
which denies public funding to programs that discriminate on the basis of race,
color, or national origin, proscribes only intentional discrimination). But see
Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 292-309 (1985) (arguing that, unlike the
statute itself, Section 601's implementing regulations may proscribe unintentional
discrimination through disparate impact standards). In any case, Alexander rejected
the existence of a private right of action to enforce Section 601. Id. at 293.
97. See U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., HHS - What We Do,
http://www.hhs.gov/about/whatwedo.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2007) (defining
the Department of Health and Human Services as the U.S. government agency
dedicated to "protecting the health of all Americans and providing essential human
services, especially for those who are least able to help themselves").
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the State to collect data on race and ethnicity for health care
discrimination.98 Without this right to sue, how can one enforce the
human rights raised in this dicussion?
A.S.: I would be really reluctant to make proposals about how I
feel my colleagues on the bench in the United States would or should
approach matters. That is another debate. I think what we have
established in South Africa, with the Grootboom case, is being
discussed throughout the world now. And we made one very
significant intellectual breakthrough when Professor Cass Sunstein
of Chicago University, who had written a powerful paper arguing
against social and economic rights being included in the new
constitutions in Eastern Europe, changed his mind.99 He said it was
the Grootboom case that made him appreciate, through the focus on
reasonableness, that the courts were using concepts that were not
unfamiliar to the law; we were not in a totally strange kind of an
area, 00 and he felt we got the balance right between enforcing certain
basic concepts of rights on the one hand and noninterference with the
details of how our government should work on the other.
Cass went on further-I think his father was in the Roosevelt
administration-and he remembered that it was Franklin Delano
Roosevelt who had spoken about the four freedoms even before
Eleanor Roosevelt, who became famous for the work that she did
with the Universal Declaration at the United Nations. He emphasized
that one of the four freedoms is freedom from want.'0' And so he has
98. See Madison-Hughes v. Shalala, 80 F.3d 1121, 1124-25 (6th Cir. 1996)
(holding that Title VI does not require the Department of Health and Human
Services to collect statistical data on the ethnic distribution of federal assistance
recipients).
99. See Stephen Holmes & Cass. R. Sunstein, The Politics of Constitutional
Revision in Eastern Europe, in RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION 275, 297 (Sanford
Levinson ed., 1995) (arguing that actual and proposed Eastern European
constitutions should make provisions for social and economic rights easy to
amend, and suggesting that legislatures are better equipped than constitutional
courts to "take [social and economic rights] provisions seriously").
100. See CASs R. SUNSTEIN, THE SECOND BILL OF RIGHTs 211-12 (2004)
(praising the Constitutional Court's reasonableness approach as one that "ensure[s]
democratic attention to important interests that might otherwise be neglected in
ordinary debate").
101. See Franklin D. Roosevelt, U.S. President, State of the Union Message to
Congress (Jan. 6, 1941), reprinted in 87 CONG. REC. 44, 46 (1941) (speaking of
"freedom from want" as "economic understandings which will secure to every
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written a book entitled, "The Four Freedoms," in which he tries to
explore the very issues that have been raised. 102
People who have heard my presentation make the point that many
state constitutions include social and economic rights,103 and that
maybe there should be more attention to the possibilities of getting
some measure of enforcement through state constitutions. But one is
not just dealing with a textual problem, though the textual problem
highlights the wider problem. The tradition in this country of legal
thinking about rights has been historically very much focused on the
right to be left alone-get the state off our backs, noninterference by
the state, and a straightforward reading of the ten provisions in the
Bill of Rights.
Well, a couple of hundred years have passed. We now have
international conventions, thinking has broadened quite a lot, and
rights are not just the rights for the patriarchal male who owned a
piece of property. That is not to be messed around with by
government. The land-owning patriarch has the right to protect his
property, his wife, his children, his slaves, and his animals, from
intrusion by the government. (Tough luck for the slaves, indigenous
people, Mexicans, and all the others who are non-citizens.) A lot has
evolved since then. But still, the very notion of fundamental rights,
of human dignity, is something that is implicit in and to some extent
explicit, in the original concepts at the time of the American
nation a healthy peacetime life for its inhabitants"); see also SUNSTEIN, supra note
1000, at 2-3 (revealing that President Roosevelt's "Four Freedoms" speech,
though not as well known within the United States, played a "major role" in the
1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights).
102. See generally SUNSTEIN, supra note 1000, at 1-5 (describing the U.S.
policy commitment to Roosevelt's "four freedoms" vision as "partial and
ambivalent, even grudging," and lamenting their absence in the constitution).
103. See, e.g., A MAGYAR KOZTARSASAG ALKOTMANYA art. 70/E, § 1
(establishing the Hungarian right to social security and to public assistance during
old age, illness, disability, and periods of unemployment); INDIA CONST. art. 41
(establishing the Indian right to work, education, and public assistance); C.F. art.
227 (establishing the Brazilian adolescents' rights "to life, health, food, education,
leisure, professional training, culture, dignity, respect, freedom, and family and
community life"); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Why Does the American Constitution
Lack Social and Economic Guarantees?, 56 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1, 3-4 (2005)
(noting the inclusion of State social and economic rights in various constitutions,
including Norway, Romania, Syria, Bulgaria, Switzerland, Ireland, Nigeria, and
Papua New Guinea).
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Revolution which have been built upon in the United States and
throughout the world.
I have found when I come to the United States-it is less intense
now but some years back, particularly at the academic level, it was
violent-that there is a tense intellectual battle between the
libertarians and the communitarians. And the libertarians are saying,
rights are rights against the state-such as the right to be left alone,
and the right to be free. The foundation of such rights really is a man
owning a piece of property with a fence around it, and what he does
inside that stockade is his own business. That is the notion of the
isolated right of the isolated free individual.
The communitarian approach is the opposite. We live in
communities. Our rights, in that sense, are indivisible, and we are
interdependent. In this sense, rights should be seen in terms of the
collective setting in which they are exercised. And these notions fit
easily in the freedom verse bread debate-the right to freedom, the
right to bread. 04 Our experience has been that it is unfortunate to
pose these as incompatible alternatives. One does not want bread
without freedom, as happened in many countries and many societies
that called themselves socialist. Yes, we are providing people with
houses, with education, with health. We have a one-party state
perhaps, a president for life; we do not allow opposition parties, nor
do we have free and open elections. But we are helping the people.
That is what the people want. The people want food in their bellies.
They are not interested in all this talk about so-called human rights.
However, that is pernicious and inappropriate. And certainly in
our country, people were fighting for the vote, for freedom, for
freedom of speech, to be listened to, to be recognized, to feel they are
a part of a society. It was the old regime that claimed that all the
Bantu wanted was a house and some food, and that they were not
interested in politics. 5 This is a pernicious and unacceptable
approach.
104. See Roosevelt, supra note 101, at 46-47 (declaring that "men do not live by
bread alone," and championing true freedom as "the supremacy of human rights
everywhere").
105. South Africa's apartheid stemmed, in part, from legislation enacting an
"arbitrary and capricious policy of racial classification." Carol M. Kaplan, Voices
Rising: an Essay on Gender, Justice, and Theater in South Africa, 3 SEATTLE J.
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If everything is put towards the collective and the social good, and
you deny these individual freedom rights, then society is not free.
And we have found that it is the right to go to court, the right to vote,
the right to make one's voice heard, and the right to demonstrate in
the streets that are absolutely fundamental for the enforcement of
social and economic rights. They should be brought to public
attention, and focused on. You make the people in parliament aware
that you exist, and that you do not exist only once every five years
when elections are coming around and they promise you something.
Rather, one has rights, including the right to be listened to, and there
is a mechanism for enforcing such rights.
On the other hand, to see it purely as individual rights, is so
isolating. It is so unreal. We live in communities. We need
communities. We get our identity, our personality from our
interaction with other people. In South Africa, we use the concept of
ubuntu, a very central notion from African philosophy. It means, I
am a person because you are a person. I can't separate my humanity
from yours-from a mutual acknowledgment of humanity.
So we are each individuals, but we are interdependent individuals,
and we find that we are using the concept of ubuntu quite frequently
in our judgments now as a South African philosophical quality that
has significant application in legal decision-making.1 0 6 If I had to
have an approach other than the communitarian or libertarian
approach, I would say that I support a dignitarian approach. 07
Human dignity is a binding factor. Human dignity means that one
cannot be squashed because of speaking one's mind in a way that
SOC. JUST. 711, 711 n.2 (2005). "Bantu" was a derogatory term used during the
apartheid era to refer to black Africans who did not speak Khoisan languages. Id.;
SALLY FRANKENTAL & OWEN B. SICHONE, SOUTH AFRICA'S DIVERSE PEOPLES
26-27 (2005).
106. See Dikoko v Mokhatla 2007 (1) BCLR 1 (CC) at 33-36 (S. Afr.) (applying
the concept of ubuntu in a defamation caim).
107. See S. AFR. CONST. 1996, § 10 ("Everyone has inherent dignity and the
right to have their dignity respected and protected."); see also Minister of Health &
Others v Treatment Action Campaign & Others 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC) at 738 (S.
Afr.) (arguing that anyone "condemned to a life below the basic level of dignified
human existence" ought to "be able to obtain relief from a Court"); Gov't of the
Republic of S. Afr. v Grootboom & Others 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) at 62 (S. Afr.)
(identifying "human dignity, freedom and equality" as foundational values of post-
apartheid South Africa).
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power does not like. Human dignity means I have a right to vote, the
right of expression, a right to determine my own life in all sorts of
ways, and the collective, the community, my neighbors, and my
family cannot sit on me, squash me, and tell me what to do, who I
am, and what I should be. So individual choice and autonomy is part
of human dignity.
But human dignity also means one lives not as an isolated
Robinson Crusoe out of touch with the world. Education means
being educated. Housing means that you are living in a community in
which resources are made available. I cannot speak my language if
there are no other people who speak that language. What is the right
of being able to say, I'll be living here always, in a little cell always?
And so it is dignity that emphasizes the importance of the
community as well as of the individual. One gets dignity from a
relationship with other people, but also from the importance of the
right to be oneself.
Now, when it comes to the specific questions asked, in our
context, we have a Constitution that is much more favorable to
judges asking those questions. But there is also a society out there in
which people are asking these questions. There is so much inequality
and injustice. 18 Resources have to be used in a fair way. We need so
much transformation. We have said in our judgments that our
Constitution is one for transformation, for change, from injustice to
justice, not just in the formal legal sense, but in the sense of how
people live and the expectations of life. 109
But I live in a nice house with hot and cold water, and I complain
if the shower is not strong enough. And Mrs. Grootboom has no
water at all, no land, and no place, and that is endemic in our
108. See Soobramoney v Minister of Health, Kwazulu-Natal 1998 (1) SA 765
(CC) at 770-71 (S. Afr.) (observing that the vestiges of apartheid-poverty,
unemployment, inadequate social security, and lack of access to clean water-are
unacceptable in a society committed both by law and in spirit to "human dignity,
freedom and equality").
109. See Grootboom 2001 (1) SA at 53 (focusing on the ability of constitutional
aspirations to improve the practical reality of "intolerable conditions"); cf
SUNSTEIN, supra note 1000, at 216-17 (hailing South Africa's Constitution as the
world's pre-eminent "transformative" constitution). In contrast, "preservative"
constitutions "seek to maintain existing practices to ensure that things do not get
worse." Id.
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society."' It is not just the few people who have fallen on bad times.
Millions of people live in grossly unacceptable conditions."' When it
comes to health programs, of course, the pressures are enormous.
The diseases are enormous; there are diseases of malnutrition, of bad
water, in addition to all the other diseases that people get through
infection and so on." 2
So the constitutional dimension does weigh in strongly. Perhaps
because the achievement of human rights in our country has been so
momentous, I like to feel that our court and the courts have a
considerable status. Certainly, they are listened to by the
government. Government has never refused to fulfill decisions, or
conform to declarations, that our Court has made. Respecting the
Constitution is part and parcel of the new culture of South Africa.
Does that mean that all is going well? I would not like to say that.
Our institutions are strong. We have committed people. It is
exceptionally important that we have public interest groups,
committed parties and individuals to take up these questions. Civil
society plays a huge role in this regard. But it is also important that
many in government were in the struggle. Most of them have come
from poor communities. They know what ill-health and disease
110. See Grootboom 2001 (1) SA at 53 (emphasizing that Mrs. Grootboom and
the other respondents represented "but a fraction" of South Africans forced into
deplorable living conditions).
11. See WORLD HEALTH ORG., COUNTRY HEALTH SYSTEM FACT SHEET 2006:
SOUTH AFRICA 1 (2006), available at
http://www.afro.who.int/home/countries/fact sheets/southafrica.pdf (revealing that
over ten percent of the population lives below the poverty line, surviving on the
equivalent of less than one U.S. dollar per day); STATISTICS SOUTH AFRICA,
GENERAL HOUSEHOLD SURVEY iv-vi (2005), available at http://
www.statssa.gov.za (indicating that, in 2005, roughly twelve percent of the
population lived in shacks, thirty-two percent of the population did not have access
to piped water, ten percent of the population used bucket toilets or had no toilet
facility, and five percent of households had at least one child who went hungry).
112. The World Health Organization estimates that twenty-one percent of the
population in South Africa is HIV positive, which accounts for fifty percent of
nationwide deaths each year. See WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 1111, at 3. Yet
other diseases, including cerebrovascular diseases, heart and respiratory diseases,
tuberculosis, diarrhea, and diabetes also contribute to a low life expectancy of only
forty-seven years for males and forty-nine years for females. Id. at 1-3. Children
under five continue to die of HIV/AIDS, diarrhea, measles, malaria, and
pneumonia at alarming rates. Id. at 1-3.
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means. They know how unequal our society still is. All these factors
have to interact.
The press has a huge role to play in this, as do lawyers-creative
and pioneering lawyers. And we have many. They are dealing with
free schooling, they are dealing with access to clinics, they are
dealing with access to water, and access to housing. It creates a very
wonderful and lively context in which to work.
Most young law students are still dreaming of getting into the
corporate world. Maybe some of them will be lucky enough to be
taught how to deal with the IMF and the World Bank. Even though
most of them are hoping to get a job in a big company or to take
cases at the bar defending people from affluent backgrounds there
are still a large number who are very committed to social programs.
And by the way, I do not begrudge people those dreams. That is
the freedom we fought for, the freedom to dream your own dreams,
to do the things the whites just took for granted. People have a right
to occupy those jobs and to think that way. That is their choice. But
also, there are huge opportunities for creative lawyers not just to be
clever, but to use their brains, their skills, and their techniques both
to do something for the society and to feel validated themselves.
You feel your vocation is something. Gee, gosh, I'm a lawyer.
You do not feel cynical about it. You feel proud about it. You feel
those years of study, the things you thought about, even often in
abstract terms, are equipping you not only to help your fellow human
beings but to work with them, in association with them, and to create
the kind of country that you really want to live in. You cannot
separate your dignity as a lawyer from the dignity of your clients and
the dignity of the people in the country.
708 [22:673
